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In Max Eastman's Venture (1927), a roman a, clef about prewar bohemian 
radicalism and the I.W.W., a character based on Mabel Dodge embarks on 
a somewhat random quest for ' 'learning' ' under the guidance of a Russian 
Marxist intellectual. When ' 'Doctor Moses" suggests that she might find 
the social sciences most interesting, Mary Kittridge responds with amiable 
indiscrimination: "Well, social and unsocial . . . I like them all ."1 This 
representation of Greenwich Village radicalism as fundamentally trivial 
and dilettantish is a familiar one, and not least so from the writings of 
onetime rebels such as Eastman and Walter Lippmann. It is not a wholly 
accurate picture, especially with regard to socialists' interests in the 
sciences—social and otherwise. 
The scholarship on American socialism just before World War I has 
often failed to take seriously the ideas associated with the movement, and 
has tended to treat as a homogeneous and rather unoriginal group the 
disputatious array of radical intellectuals who attempted to put socialism 
on a new scientific footing. Writers associated with the Masses, the New 
Review and the Seven Arts have certainly been seen as interesting, colorful 
and even as leavening influences in a society struggling to shrug off its 
Victorian hangover and enter the modern age. But while it is quite proper 
to place them within the context of a more general upheaval in western 
culture, this is also to risk losing sight of their specific attempts as 
intellectuals to give new shape and direction to a political movement. To 
characterize this group as partisans of a "lyrical left" or as fomenters of an 
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"innocent rebellion" is in part to overlook their serious reassessment of the 
socialist movement's theoretical foundations, a rough synthesis of Charles 
Darwin's and Herbert Spencer's evolutionary theories with Second-
International Marxism.2 It was their critique of that scientific tradition—a 
critique whose contours emerged in socialist discourse between 1912 and 
1917—that gave radicals of this generation their distinctiveness as thinkers. 
By re-orienting socialist theory away from Darwin and Spencer and toward 
the findings of post-Darwinian science and philsosphy, new socialist critics 
such as Walter Lippmann, Robert Lowie and William English Walling 
hoped to push socialist political strategies and tactics in more activist and 
radically egalitarian directions. An examination of their interventions in 
socialist discourse will reveal a significant effort to build a radical, 
democratic politics and culture equal to the demands of a newly "mode rn" 
world, and may also cast light on the deradicalization of some socialist 
intellectuals at the crisis of World War I. 
i 
Socialist evolutionism had a considerable history before the rise of 
Greenwich Village radicalism. Marx and Engels understood Darwinism to 
be a revolutionary force in nineteenth-century science and culture. It 
historicized the natural world, naturalized humankind, and destroyed 
"metaphysical" and teleological world views. They did not claim, how-
ever, that it provided the basis for a revolutionary social movement, and 
the once-revolutionary thrust of Darwin's views had indeed been largely 
blunted and absorbed by the early twentieth century when progressives 
and pragmatists invoked Darwin as their philosophical godfather. None-
theless, beginning in the 1870s, American socialists—Marxian and other-
wise—did graft socialism onto evolutionary theories of nature and society. 
The founding of the Socialist Party in 1901 established a vehicle for 
"scientific" socialism in a culture that saw science, in Thorstein Veblen's 
phrase, as " a word to conjure wi th ." 3 
The apparent congruence between Marxian historical " laws" and 
progressive evolutionism gave the Second International its distinctly 
scientistic and inevitabilist cast and shaped the thinking of the American 
Socialist Party's first group of intellectuals. Because socialism was now to 
be "scientific" and no longer "Utopian," American Marxists undertook 
an extensive discussion on the relations between socialism and evolution. 
Darwin and Spencer were typically conjoined as revolutionary figures 
barely subordinate to Marx in importance: Darwin for the reasons noted 
above; Spencer for applying the evolutionary principle to all realms of 
thought and experience in his massive "synthetic philosophy," and also for 
elaborating the analogy between organisms and societies from which many 
socialists concluded that progressive structural integration and collectiviza-
tion must follow. Therefore the trust phenomenon, for example, could be 
unequivocally welcomed as a harbinger of the organic socialist state. 
Evolution was typically seen as a cosmic continuum with a predetermined 
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outcome. Darwinism was enfolded within Spencer's much larger philo-
sophical edifice, while in turn Marx and Engels were understood to have 
completed the work began by the two British evolutionists, supplying their 
own denouement in place of Spencer's laissez-faire Utopia—a socialist 
capstone for the grand bio-social evolutionary synthesis. Thus American 
Marxists conflated natural with social evolution and proclaimed, with the 
radiant optimism of Gaylord Wilshire, "Socialism Inevitable!"4 
Socialist discourse, including theoretical and political writings, popular 
lectures and fiction, was permeated by evolution and often showed an 
uncritical deference to the authority of popular evolutionary racism, 
nativism and antifeminism. But if scientific knowledge was generally 
considered revolutionary and a crucial component of any radical's educa-
tion, the actual meaning of the Darwinian revolution was a matter for 
sharp debate. Adherents of contending party factions variously interpreted 
the significance for Marxism of social organicism, neo-Lamarckianism, 
mutation theory and other developments. As intra-party antagonisms 
intensified between 1908 and 1912, scientific ideas were increasingly 
reduced to mere weapons in the arsenals of warring factions; "evolution" 
and "revolution" came to be identified with distinct political positions in 
the party, and serious theoretical discussion declined drastically. 
Coincident with this ascendancy of politics over theory were changes in 
the sciences themselves. In the rapidly professionalizing natural sciences, 
grand systems like Spencer's had given way to an ethos of controlled 
experimentation and carefully limited conclusions. The social sciences 
were emancipating themselves from biological determinism as anthropolo-
gists, sociologists and psychologists developed the modern concept of 
"cul ture ." 5 The party's founding generation showed little receptivity to 
the new critiques of Spencer and Darwin, which entered socialist discourse 
primarily though the younger intellectuals' aggressive criticisms of ortho-
doxy. As evolutionism proved increasingly compatible with the progressive 
capitalist world-view of liberals such as Woodrow Wilson, younger Ameri-
can socialists attuned to newer currents of thought began to recognize and 
attack the weaknesses of the socialist evolutionary synthesis.6 
Robert Rives La Monte, an established left-wing socialist evolutionist, 
welcomed the insurgent group whom he called "The New Intellectuals' ' in 
a 1914 New Review article. To the orthodox but friendly La Monte, these 
cosmopolitan and adventurous rebels showed respect for the Marxian 
method but considerably greater "breadth of vision" than most of their 
predecessors, who had been either unscientific or narrowly dogmatic. 
While La Monte's article concerned Max Eastman and Walter Lippmann, 
his criteria roughly fit Floyd Dell, James Oppenheim, Louis Fraina, 
Robert Lowie and William English Walling, among others. Some were 
socialist veterans, some newcomers; all gravitated to New York City's new 
centers for socialist discourse such as the Masses and the New Review, which 
resounded with the ideas of Bergson, Sorel, Nietzsche, Freud, James, 
Dewey and Boas. Although wary of their unorthodox Marxism and 
especially suspicious of Lippmann's fascination with "statecraft" and 
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strong leadership, the fatherly La Monte thought their flaws a fair 
exchange for the fresh breezes they had set in motion.7 
What has not been noted about this rather mixed assortment of leftist 
intellectuals who made up the radical wing of the "Innocent Rebellion' ' is 
their common, if seldom coordinated, assault on the evolutionary under-
pinnings of socialism. Their clamoring for a decisive break with the past 
and their celebration of youth, modernity and " the new" were always 
implicitly, and sometimes explicitly, a rejection of passive evolutionary 
fatalism and a demand for emancipation from the constraints of biology 
and history. They were less concerned with Darwin, Spencer and origins 
than they were with James, Dewey, and with shaping the future. The 
upsurges of popular Freudianism and of Boasian cultural relativism 
diminished the cachet of evolution as modernization and relegitimized the 
"primitive," both for Village devotees of psychoanalysis and for students 
of non-western cultures once considered evolutionary failures. Bergson was 
regarded with suspicion on the left, but his emphases on intuition, process 
and "creative evolution" suggested a universe more poetic and more 
malleable than the older product of dull Darwinian selection, which had 
been accessible to the intellect only through patient empirical investiga-
tion. Attacks on Bergson in the New Review still betrayed a certain 
enthusiasm for the French philosopher's élan, which seemed so well 
matched to the eclectic and vital radicalism of Greenwich Village itself.8. 
Eastman and Dell at the Masses, Oppenheim and Van Wyck Brooks at 
the Seven Arts, and Fraina at the New Review all attacked the ideas and spirit 
of socialist evolutionism, while Arthur Bullard's novels A Man's World 
(1912) and Comrade Yetta (1913) introduced the new perspective to socialist 
fiction.9 But William English Walling, Walter Lippmann and the anthro-
pologist Robert Lowie most creatively diverted new currents from the 
dominant intellectual stream to undercut the musty evolutionary deter-
minism and social organicism which they associated with a stodgy and 
bureaucratized Socialist Party. They carefully probed the persistent ten-
sions in socialist thought between activism and inevitabilism, will and 
natural law, evolution and revolution. Where socialist evolutionists had 
always sought—and found—an emergent socialist order amid capitalist 
chaos, these New Intellectuals equated such evolutionary optimism with a 
naive nineteenth-century faith in "progress ," and hoped to revise the 
socialist scientific ideal to emphasize method over content, the future over 
the past, culture over biology, and human creativity over passive predic-
tion. Walling attempted to fuse science and socialism with Dewey's 
pragmatic philosophy—"the method and the spirit of modern Socialist 
thought."1 0 Lippmann invoked Henri Bergson and Georges Sorel to score 
the Marxists for their fatalism, and called for a new scientific "mastery" 
over random evolutionary "drif t ." Robert Lowie, like Walling, attacked 
socialists for underwriting racism, anti-feminism and eugenics with evolu-
tionary theory. He also sought to replace the socialists' outmoded evolu-
tionary anthropology with the cultural relativism of Franz Boas. 
Despite their significant differences, the three shared certain character-
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istics. All were younger than the party's founding generation,11 lived in the 
area of New York City, had connections to Greenwich Village radicalism 
and served on the editorial board of the New Review. All were broadly 
educated, intellectually curious and committed to exploring what Walling 
called " the larger aspects of socialism." None was an orthodox Marxist, 
and all were touched in some way by pragmatism. Believing that no truth 
was "final ," they shared a studied irreverence for the Marxist classics. All 
were mavericks in a party whose New York organization was politically 
and culturally conservative, hostile to the New Review and disdainful of all 
bohemian radical hangers-on. 
ii 
No one evoked more powerfully than Walter Lippmann this genera-
tion's bewildered gropings through a liberated present still strewn with the 
debris of a century's battles against " the sanctity of property, the 
patriarchal family, hereditary caste, the dogma of sin, obedience to 
authority."12 Lippmann considered these battles won, but evolution was 
for him only a pleasant if pervasive myth without instrumental value. The 
thrust of his first two books was that government, social institutions and 
mental habits had not evolved in line with modern conditions—progressive 
and socialist rhetoric to the contrary. Modern life was something entirely 
new, and evolutionary theories of progress, whether Marxist or Spen-
cerian, could not help this generation to confront the riddle of freedom and 
the struggle to create an unformed future. 
While A Preface to Politics (1913) and Drift and Mastery (1914) are deeply 
problematic as "socialist" works, Lippmann wrote the books in the 
immediate context of his socialist experiences as a disillusioned party 
activist, a quiet onlooker at Mabel Dodge's salon and a sometime I.W.W. 
supporter. In both books the author directed key questions and criticisms 
at the socialists, whom he fleetingly hoped would help to " invent" a 
democratic culture that would provide direction and discipline for the 
rudderless young society. But for Lippmann, the worst features of the 
hidebound "rout ineer" were epitomized by the orthodox Marxists' evolu-
tionary determinism. True to La Monte's uneasiness with Lippmann's 
forays beyond orthodoxy, the promise of Marxism as mastery in the earlier 
book had soured by the second into the spectre of socialist "drif t ."1 3 
Like Lowie and Walling, Lippmann did not reject evolutionary theory 
as such. But when he condemned most modern socialist thought as 
thoroughly deterministic and antithetical to will and creativity, it was the 
version of Marxism that had been embedded in evolutionary thinking that 
he addressed. Against Spencer's dessicated rationalism and faith that 
science, armed with evolutionary laws, could predict anything, Lippmann 
posed the idea that social creeds began with human desires. Marx's 
scientific writings therefore seemed to him no more permanently " t r u e " 
than Spencer's, their claims to truth being justified only by actions that 
tended to fulfill their author's root desire for a just social order. While 
77 
respecting Marx's contribution, Lippmann thus sought to purge the 
American movement of scientific determinism, to substitute an instrumen-
tal conception of political and social theory and to clear the way for the 
elaboration of a "new philosophical basis" for socialism.14 
As socialist inevitabilism had been formed in the evolutionary-deter-
minist tradition, Lippmann turned to that tradition's critics to combat its 
grip on socialism: to the syndicalist Georges Sorel's " m y t h , " to William 
James's "will to believe," to Henri Bergson's vision of self-creation—in 
short, to the "mystical" side of pragmatism, which the Deweyite Walling 
would explicitly reject. Marxism was for Lippmann a useful social " m y t h " 
in Sorel's parlance. That myth had become an active social force through 
the Marxists' dogged "war of culture," which had "worked," in the 
pragmatic sense, by establishing the primacy of economic and environ-
mental factors and by giving the workers a sense of their historical role that 
went deeper than mere class partisanship. It now needed replacing by 
another, perhaps not more " t r u e , " but simply more "useful," than 
evolutionary determinism: one that would place human will and desire at 
the source of thought and action.15 
Lippmann's emphasis on will was not detached from the social 
struggles of 1912. One effect of the I.W.W.'s Lawrence, Massachusetts 
textile strike was to demonstrate that workers of diverse ethnic and craft 
backgrounds could unite to act decisively, and that a revolutionary culture 
would not be created solely by alienated intellectuals. Lippmann registered 
that strike's profound impact and implications, and when he called upon 
socialists to see the individual as "creator" rather than as "creature ," he 
reflected the New Intellectuals' dawning realization that the Socialist 
Party's narrowly biological and economic conception of the worker could 
only retard the formation of a socialist working class. As Lippmann noted, 
the syndicalists could no longer be treated as mindless cattle because, in 
their furious revolt against industrial servitude, they had "ceased to be 
cattle." The rebellious spirit of the I.W.W. informed Lippmann's demand 
that socialists likewise "cease to look upon socialism as inevitable in order 
to make it so . " 1 6 
Lippmann's case shows how pragmatism offered the New Intellectuals 
an alternative to evolutionary determinism but also drew them away from 
fundamental Marxist ideas. As he searched for principles of action, 
Lippmann drew the distinction between Darwin's revolutionary method 
and his less-interesting conclusions that characterized New Intellectual 
thinking17 and also showed its dependence on liberal intellectual discourse. 
It was, after all, John Dewey who had restated in 1910 this insight that 
Marx and Engels had also developed much earlier. In Dewey's terms, 
Darwin had "conquered the phenomena of life for the principle of 
transition, and thereby freed the new logic for application to mind and 
morals and life." While the early Lippmann may seem closer in spirit to 
the eclectic and ebullient irrationalism of William James, it was essentially 
Dewey's sensitivity to process and adaptation that Lippmann hoped his 
"inventors" would apply to the Freudian "task of civilizing our im-
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pulses." Unionists, feminists, socialists and businessmen who embodied 
this pragmatic sensitivity would somehow meld the burgeoning energies of 
their diverse and sometimes conflicting constituencies into a radically 
democratic movement. Lippmann was rather vague on how this would 
happen, but he clearly believed in an open future and could have no 
sympathy for the Spencerian socialists' preordained design.18 
When he called for an activist Marxism enriched by "all the culture of 
the age," Lippmann prefigured the opposition between "drif t" and 
scientific "mastery" that would dominate his next book. Insofar as 
Lippmann was ever a Marxist, he believed that a Marxist theory stripped 
of evolutionary determinism and fed by the many streams of contemporary 
culture would be a major source of mastery over the flux of modern life. 
But if Lippmann's Marxism was only a working myth imposed upon that 
flux, then it had no roots in social reality and was reduced to a rationale for 
self-correcting social manipulation. Such a tenuous Marxist commitment 
easily evaporated as Lippmann became convinced that the left could not 
free itself from evolutionary determinism. Gravitating to the managerial 
pole of pragmatism, he soon saw modern, professional business executives, 
not workers, as the primary " inventors" and "civilizers" of the future.19 
Between the Preface to Politics and Drift and Mastery came Lippmann's 
bitter apostasy from radicalism. The second book described the post-
liberation chaos of the Preface as an epoch of aimless liberal "drif t ," and 
saw socialism no longer as a solution but as part of the problem. The key to 
creating a future, to mastering drift, was now "science"—in which 
scientific socialism played no part. The scientific spirit substituted "con-
scious intention for unconscious striving," offering a method, and indeed a 
"cul ture ," through which to treat life "not as something given but as 
something to be shaped." Gone were the vitalism of Bergson and the 
irrationalism of Sorel, along with the radical promise of Marx: in science 
lay the "discipline" to achieve, not an ecstatic vision of freedom, but " a 
chastened and honest d ream." Politically, this meant a kind of pluralistic 
collectivism. Popular forces and administrative power would somehow 
balance one another; labor's interests would be represented by unions 
modelled on the conservative railroad brotherhoods, not the I.W.W.20 
The disillusioned Lippmann reserved some of his sharpest words for 
the "darlings of evolution." Capturing perfectly the spirit of the tradi-
tional socialist evolutionary theodicy, he noted that socialists stopped short 
of believing that "whatever is, is r ight ," assuming rather that "whatever is 
going to be, is going to be r ight ." At their worst, Marxists were not 
revolutionaries but "interested pedants of destiny" who knew God's plan 
well enough to prompt him occasionally. Believing socialism inevitable, 
they had all but demolished any rationale for having a socialist party aside 
from its appearance in Marx 's script. Despite his high hopes of the 
previous year, Lippmann declared that socialist thought, still mired in 
evolutionism, had simply ground to a halt.21 
Lippmann had served socialism well by criticizing the theoretical 
weaknesses that had indeed undercut the movement's political force. He 
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overstated American Marxism's impermeability to new ideas, as he 
himself and other New Intellectuals provided counterexamples, but he was 
correct in the sense that over the long run their ideas were not to prevail— 
at least not in the party.22 Having rejected the socialist scientific tradition, 
Lippmann drifted toward progressivism and opted for science without 
socialism. One of his colleagues at the New Review, Robert Lowie, tried to 
redefine both the tradition and the party's uses of it. 
Like Walter Lippmann, Robert Lowie was a brilliant young iconoclast 
and a lucid and witty writer. Perhaps appropriately for an ethnologist, he 
imagined himself something of an outsider to American culture. Born in 
Vienna, he was steeped in European literature as well as in science; 
growing up in New York City's German-speaking emigre community, he 
delighted in flouting the genteel reformers' blue laws by drinking beer on 
Sundays in basement saloons. The few published reminiscences of Lowie, 
including his own memoirs, tend to minimize or ignore his radical past and 
to portray him as "p roper" almost to the point of dullness—an image 
seemingly matched to his intellectual stance as a tough, no-nonsense 
empiricist.23 But Lowie's non-ethnological writings for radical and liberal 
journals from 1904 to 1922 reveal a man passionately committed both to 
establishing the scientific status of anthropology, and to applying the 
Boasian perspective to radical thought. He wrote little on party politics, 
but showed an unparalleled dedication to the socialist discourse on science, 
persisting almost alone through the New Review's last, war-ravaged days in 
addressing scientific and theoretical topics. 
Lowie adopted two tasks in his socialist writings: reassessing the 
pantheon of scientists admired in socialist circles, and intervening in 
socialist discourse against reactionary deployments of scientific ideas. The 
first task meant rethinking his own intellectual upbringing. Lowie came of 
age just as the sciences were shifting away from inflated evolutionary 
positivism and toward an empiricist position. Having schooled himself as a 
youth in the works of Spencer, Darwin and Haeckel and in the Spencerian 
Popular Science Monthly, he found his convictions shaken during college by 
Jacques Loeb's mechanistic psychology, Thomas Hunt Morgan's skep-
ticism about natural selection and the assaults of Karl Pearson, Ernst 
Mach and William James on Spencer's "block universe." Socialists had 
always praised Darwin for overthrowing "metaphysics," but Lowie found 
himself rejecting an analogous "evolutionary metaphysics" that had 
pervaded the natural and social sciences. As a Boasian, he ignored socialist 
orthodoxy by uncoupling evolution from history and culture. Calling social 
evolution "unhistorical" in 1909, he argued for the meticulous examina-
tion of every culture as " a unique historical product" whose trajectory 
could not be predicted, nor its degree of enlightenment judged, according 
to Euro-American preconceptions.24 
As a leftist and a partisan of the revolution sweeping the sciences, 
Lowie was ideally positioned to revise the scientific assumptions that had 
shaped American socialist thought. Beginning with an appreciation of 
Spencer just after the latter's death in 1903, Lowie produced a long series 
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of articles reconsidering the achievements of the great nineteenth-century 
scientist-philosophers. He sought not to write a "great m a n " history of 
science, portraying scientists rather as specialized workers pursuing a 
cooperative, international enterprise.25 The articles showed a scientific 
sophistication far exceeding that of previous socialist writers, but Lowie 
wrote clearly and incisively for non-specialists, dispensing measured 
endorsements and warnings. He was no mere idol-smasher, but often 
confined his enthusiasm for the grand old men of evolution to their 
historical roles as path-breaking popularizers and champions of political 
freedom. Thus Lowie gently relegated the pioneering evolutionists to the 
past; like Lippmann, he believed that the future belonged to the living. 
Lowie praised Darwin's scientific achievements but deplored the 
impetus Darwinism had given to " the construction of artificial evolution-
ary schemes. " This was his fundamental criticism of Spencer, Haeckel and 
Lewis Henry Morgan, the principle forefathers of the socialist-evolutionist 
world view. In 1904, when John Spargo ranked Spencer with Darwin and 
Marx as the "mightiest of modern thinkers" and called the synthetic 
philosophy one of the previous century's greatest achievements, Lowie 
praised Spencer for his devotion to reason and inspiring resistance to 
"current dogmas"—and not, conspicuously, for his system of thought. 
Lowie's was a charitable interpretation that saw the great rationalist as a 
thorough and objective scientist, but he partially reinvented Spencer in 
order to portray him as a pioneer of the scientific method and spirit while 
quietly dismissing his conclusions. Later references to Spencer were less 
kind. In 1916 Lowie credited Ernst Mach with exposing Spencer's system 
as "metaphysics tricked out in scientific garb , " and a year later derided 
British attempts to revive Spencer in the age of modern, "anti-univer-
salist" thought. He insisted on the several sciences' philosophical and 
methodological autonomy, standing for a Jamesian pluralism against the 
monistic mindset that Spencer shared with Haeckel and Morgan. He 
especially stressed the social sciences' emancipation from the tyranny of 
biology.26 
Haeckel and Morgan drew a mixture of censure and praise from 
Lowie. Haeckel, whose thought encompassed an amalgam of radical and 
reactionary ideas, would not be remembered for the monism that had 
inspired so many socialists, but as a courageous advocate for evolution in 
the face of stern academic and clerical opposition. Lowie sharply con-
demned Haeckel's view that "inferior races" were transitional forms 
between apes and humans—a view that some among Lowie's socialist 
readers used to justify their scant attention to Black organization and civil 
rights. Morgan's Ancient Society (1877) had provided another scientific prop 
for socialist racism and immigration restrictionist sentiment. As inter-
preted and popularized by Engels' Origin of the Family, Private Property and the 
State (1884), Morgan's universal stages of savagery, barbarism and civiliza-
tion were standard in socialist discourse. In attacking this version of the 
block universe, Lowie argued that empirical Boasian ethnology showed 
cultural evolution to be no unilinear, predictable process; no monistic 
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scheme could encompass the variousness of the world's peoples. He 
suggested that New Review readers eschew the ranking of races, and set 
aside Ancient Society for Boas's The Mind of Primitive Man (1911). But he was 
largely ignored by the party's old guard: in 1916, the International Socialist 
Review touted Ancient Society in terms that showed no awareness of Lowie's 
attack on the orthodox Morgan-Engels model.27 
Among the others whom Lowie applauded for their scientific prowess 
and for their politics were Ernst Mach and Ludwig Feuerbach, who were 
notable for their empiricism, attacks on metaphysics and radical demo-
cratic ideas. But highest in his esteem stood Alfred Russel Wallace. At a 
time when some thought Wallace an embarrassing crank, Lowie praised 
his open and flexible mind as the source of both his undeniable scientific 
achievement and his controversial tastes for spiritualism and socialism. 
Sympathetic to Wallace's politics, Lowie especially approved of his 
opposition to eugenics and to all such schemes of social control by the 
mandarins of an "arrogant scientific priestcraft." Politics aside, the 
qualities that Lowie admired in Wallace clearly linked the latter to William 
James; one who combined the Jamesian spirit of pluralism and open 
inquiry with the rigorous empiricism and left political commitments of 
Boas or of Lowie himself would have constituted Lowie's ideal scientist-
philosopher for the twentieth century, and a fitting figure for a new socialist 
pantheon.28 
As the scientific watchdog over socialist thought, Lowie pointed out the 
political implications of the new anthropology. He invoked historical 
particularism against anti-Bolshevists who denied that Russia could build 
socialism before passing through a Western-style capitalist phase: such 
skeptics, Lowie felt, were simply enslaved to the Morgan mindset. Some of 
these critics, such as Spargo and A. M. Simons, were in fact ex-socialists 
who had been purged by the war of their radicalism, but not of their 
monistic evolutionary world view.29 
Lowie also mounted a relativist attack on the socialist racism, often 
grounded in readings of Haeckel and Morgan, that marred even the left-
wing New Review. This involved him peripherally in a fracas over the 
integration of Southern locals when the integrationists adopted his critique. 
Following the imperatives of both profession and politics, he reduced most 
previous ethnology to the "globe trotter's pronunciamentos"; rigorous 
modern methods, argued Lowie, had rendered meaningless the notion of 
"fittest" races and of cultural "complexity" as a normative category, and 
had shattered the assumption that a straight developmental line ran from 
apes to humans, with Blacks near the bottom and Caucasians at the 
pinnacle. If Lowie was less than a perfect relativist, occasionally charac-
terizing one culture as "beh ind" another, and if his arguments had little 
impact on those who continued to claim that Blacks' evolutionary retarda-
tion was proven by their low estate in American life, his remained 
nonetheless a remarkably progressive intervention in a socialist discourse 
that was still disfigured by evolutionary racism. He also pointed out links 
between biological racism and biological anti-feminism, and in 1916 co-
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authored with Leta Stetter Hollingworth a comprehensive deflation of 
scientific anti-feminism for the Scientific Monthly. But their arguments were 
never registered by the once-lively socialist feminist discourse on evolution, 
which had disintegrated by 1913 with the demise of the Women's National 
Committee and of the journal Socialist Woman.30 If prewar American 
socialism left to its successors a meager legacy of support for women and 
minorities, it was not for lack of effort by a very few such as Lowie. 
Like Walter Lippmann, Lowie tried to establish a new scientific basis 
for socialism by undermining the monism and evolutionary positivism in 
which socialist theory was trapped. He projected the Jamesian vision of an 
open universe in which human cultures were free from the constraints of 
biology and, in the large and portentous sense, of history. He was no 
materialist, but Lowie's "well-known lack of interest in environment and 
economics" has been exaggerated. These factors may have played small 
part in his prewar ethnological writings, but his commentaries in socialist 
journals indicate that what he rejected was a ' 'vulgar materialism" not 
unlike that against which Marx and Engels had also inveighed. His early 
socialist writing showed a consistent concern with the impact of environ-
mental changes on culture, and his criticisms of economic determinism did 
not constitute a blanket denial that economy also influenced culture. That 
Lowie chose Mach's empiricism as the path out of the nineteenth century's 
evolutionary impasse did not reflect any stance on the Leninist critique of 
Mach, which was then unknown in American socialist discourse.31 
But Lowie's commitment to socialism eventually paled in the shadow 
of his commitment to scientific work. A vocal critic of the war through 
1915, he remained throughout the carnage a steadfast champion of the 
German scientific tradition—an unpatriotic attitude in itself, according to 
ex-socialist evolutionist Gaylord Wilshire, who called German " 'Kultur ' 
and science" the real "menace to the world." But Lowie ceased to write 
for the socialist press—what remained of it—when he left New York for 
Berkeley in the twenties. His legacy to the left was expressed in his 1922 
article on "Science" for Harold Stearns' Civilization in the United States. 
Lowie summed up his own experience when he urged constant critical 
inquiry into the bases of one's own scientific stance—an enterprise that for 
Lowie was grounded in a serious immersion in the European literary 
tradition and in left political values. Lowie brought to socialism and to 
science a "reasoned nonconformism" to all dogmas, scientific and other-
wise.32 It was an attitude shared by too few of his colleagues on the left, 
who once having learned their science from the bourgeoisie, seemingly 
wanted to learn no more. 
William English Walling shared with Lowie and Lippmann a skep-
ticism of evolution and an attraction to pragmatism. Breaking sharply with 
the whole tradition of socialist thought as it had developed since the 1870s, 
he connected a searching critique of socialist scientism with an analysis of 
the class and political dynamics of the movement. As a maverick left-wing 
theorist who only joined the party in 1910 after several years of unofficial 
involvement, he supported the I.W.W. and eloquently attacked scientific 
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socialist racism, nativism and anti-feminism. For Walling, as for Lip-
pmann and Lowie, building socialism meant revolutionizing not just 
politics and economics but literature, art, science and history. The young 
Marx had once called for " a ruthless criticism of everything existing"; in a 
similar spirit, Walling invoked for the New Intellectuals Walt Whitman's 
readiness to reject all received culture: "What is known I strip away/ I 
launch all men and women forward with me into the Unknown." 3 3 
It was a unifying theme in Walling's writings from 1909 to 1916 that 
the idea of evolution, a product of ruling-class culture now uncritically 
absorbed into the matrix of socialist theory, must come under serious 
scrutiny. He remained an evolutionary thinker in method but hammered 
on the foundations of the evolutionary synthesis that saw social evolution as 
long, slow, organic, ending inevitably in socialism and implying reformist 
strategies for the interim. While that synthesis reflected socialists' general 
infatuation with biology and evolution, it usually appeared in Walling's 
writings as the characteristic ideology of two class formations which he 
thought would briefly dominate society before the arrival of genuine, 
democratic socialism. These were the state capitalists, exponents of 
Wilsonian progressivism who represented the interests of small capital, 
and the state socialists, comprising the aristocracy of labor and their 
fabian, bureaucratic-intellectual retainers. Walling particularly despised 
the second group, consigning most of his enemies to it and vigorously 
attacking its evolutionary ideology—an amalgam of biology, social or-
ganicism and historicist inevitabilism. It was in this vein that he charac-
terized socialist immigration restrictionists as reactionary historicists, 
reformists and "practically Laborites."3 4 
His search for a democratic alternative to this outdated ideology—one 
that would retain the revolutionary Darwinian spirit—brought Walling to 
Dewey's pragmatism. In his most important book, The Larger Aspects of 
Socialism (1913), Walling's appropriation of pragmatism was not simply 
opportunistic, as La Monte and other orthodox critics charged, but an 
attempt to reorient socialist theory away from its evolutionary heritage and 
toward the findings and spirit of modern science. From Copernicus to 
Darwin, science had steadily diminished the stature of humankind; 
Walling saw in Dewey's stress on intelligence and creativity an ' 'anthropo-
centric" science that would reassure men and women of their power to 
modify their environment, to control evolution itself. And pragmatism was 
democratic, at least in appearance. Once progressive educational methods 
had spread the pragmatic, scientific spirit throughout society, science 
would function not as an "irresponsible dictator" but as an experimental 
guide to a genuinely democratic social life.35 
Walling shared Lippmann's enthusiasm for " the scientific method," if 
also his vagueness about the mechanics of its application to society. He 
hoped that an infusion of pragmatism would make of socialist theory a 
"prospective" science, its task to project and test usable futures, rather 
than to rationalize submission to the determining power of a dead past. 
Between 1913 and 1916, "pragmat ism" became Walling's code word for 
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any tendency to reject evolutionary determinism: an exemplary socialist 
poet was "not an evolutionist of the old school," but a "pragmatist ." 
Pragmatic socialists would look not from the past into the future, but from 
the future into the present: "We are evolutionists," announced Walling, 
"but we have reversed the very direction of evolutionary thought."3 6 
In his attempt to reinterpret Marx and Engels as proto-pragmatists, 
Walling did recapture something of the spirit of their original engagement 
with Darwinism. That the first scientific socialists were "pragmat ic" 
primarily meant for Walling that they had rejected the earlier static, 
mechanical materialisms and had emphasized human history and action 
over biology; he also restored Engels' sense that science and philosophy 
were open-ended and that truths developed through praxis.37 While 
Walling could only tenuously and selectively link Marx and Engels to 
Dewey, the real point was to revive something that he could call "Marx-
ism" as a flexible and activist theory of social revolution. Like Lowie, 
Walling saw that such a revival depended largely on decanonizing the 
cluster of evolutionary thinkers who had so influenced socialist thought. 
Pragmatism was a tool well-fitted to this task. American socialists such as 
Ernest Untermann had traditionally followed the monist Haeckel, seeing 
evolution as the "key to the universe"; pragmatism denied that there was 
any single key, and determined to subject all hypotheses to rigorous 
practical testing. Thus where Marxist philosopher Joseph Dietzgen's 
materialism had been used to underwrite monistic socialist evolutionism, 
Walling hoped that pragmatic socialism would follow the scientific method, 
not illusory scientific " laws ." If, as Dewey claimed, a law only described a 
set of changes observed during a finite period, then dialectics could only 
produce unscientific absolute generalizations, and Engels' philosophical 
work could no longer be taken seriously.38 Walling's strategy was actually 
to outstrip the evolutionists by reintroducing a Darwinian sense of flux and 
randomness to the social and cultural spheres. 
The New Intellectuals typically celebrated " the new" and emphasized 
the sharp division between past and future, but Walling was perhaps the 
most extreme among them in his distaste for history. He charged that the 
vogue of evolution had promoted a reactionary fixation on the past, 
turning historical precedents into evolutionary " laws" that justified the 
existing order. While such logic might be associated with a stereotypical 
"social Darwinist," Walling pointed out that socialist advocates of eu-
genics and racism also focused on their targets' supposedly unworthy 
histories. Thus when Victor Berger argued that Asians' "fifty thousand 
years" of insular history had fixed their racial psychology and rendered 
them unassimilable to American life, Walling derided this "hackneyed 
appeal to ancient history, familiar in all reactionary reasoning."3 9 It was 
such reasoning, grounded in history and in truncated evolutionism, that 
Walling identified with the state socialists. 
Spencer's contradictory impact on Walling epitomized Walling's own 
complex relationship to the party. Much of what finally distinguished the 
socialist evolutionists from Walling was their differing orientation to 
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Spencer: Walling still championed the individualistic and libertarian side 
of Spencer's thought; the "state socialists"—and in fact, most American 
Marxist intellectuals—had rejected those values while retaining Spencer's 
social organicism and "optimistic fatalism" about evolution. Walling 
could therefore cite Spencer's example against the state-socialist schemes of 
Edmond Kelly and Charlotte Perkins Gilman to subject convicts and 
Blacks to military regimentation. Because he understood Spencer as a 
product of the bourgeois revolution, Walling was not unnaturally drawn to 
him despite their political differences. Walling's radicalism was an out-
growth of his family's Midwestern liberalism, and he saw socialism as the 
only true heir to the French and American Revolutionary, "Rights of 
M a n " traditions—a view to which he held steadfastly while Gilman and 
other white, old-stock socialists explicitly renounced it. Yet Walling 
understood that Spencer had never transcended the vison of his class, and 
many of what Walling saw as Spencer's most pernicious ideas now 
pervaded the socialist movement. Spencer's view of slow, organic, inevita-
ble evolution was for Walling both Utopian and "narcotizing," but it had 
significantly structured the socialist evolutionary synthesis.40 
Although Walling attacked the post-Darwinian "reign of biology" in 
the social sciences, he also saw a waning in the imagery of nature and 
society as a bitter struggle for existence as capitalism left behind the era of 
rapacious competition and—he thought— international war. It was not 
old-fashioned "social Darwinism" that concerned him, but a newer 
incarnation of biological determinism as the state capitalists and state 
socialists, offspring of an era of trusts, bureaucracy and government 
ownership, raised the standard of the tightly organized, hierarchical 
"social organism." Walling's pragmatic polemic against evolution was 
thus most importantly a critique of the corporate capitalist organizational 
model as it had shaped socialist thought. If state capitalist Woodrow 
Wilson shared an organicist view of society and government with state 
socialist Ramsay MacDonald, both were equally wrong according to a 
vaguely defined "modern sociology." Walling's grasp of the " m o d e r n " 
scientific thought that he constantly invoked was not always firm, but his 
political vision was clear: organicist socialism, formed around the negative 
pole of Spencerian thought, meant eugenics, racism and rule by intellec-
tual elites who sought order and organization, not an end to classes. 
Spencer had been right to attack the socialism that reduced individuals to 
insignificant cells in a social organism; but Spencer and the state socialists 
were ultimately alike in their reluctance to disturb that organism's natural 
growth toward perfect organic interdependence. Thus, said Walling, 
"anti-individualist 'Socialism' and anti-socialist individualism are at the 
bottom one ." 4 1 
The Larger Aspects of Socialism caused an uproar in socialist intellectual 
circles. La Monte, a self-proclaimed monistic Marxist, condemned prag-
matism as opportunistic and linked it to the right-wing socialism of Victor 
Berger. James Oneal, also suspicious of pragmatism, stood with the old 
socialist order in his reluctance to stop ransacking biology for revolutionary 
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implications. Lippmann rushed to Walling's defense but later attacked him 
for lapsing in his next book, Progressivism-and After (1914), from the 
pragmatic spirit into inevitabilism. While it can be argued that there was 
no sharp break in perspective between the two books,42 what Walling did 
fail to do through his writings of 1914-1916 was to answer La Monte's 
criticism that pragmatism was an ideology of reform. Berger's tactics in 
Milwaukee politics had "worked," noted La Monte, and it was precisely 
those "practical" and "constructive" socialists who still dominated the 
party in 1913 and who wanted to jettison revolutionary socialism al-
together. One might object that reducing pragmatism to sheer opportun-
ism was to vulgarize the philosophical tradition associated with James, 
Dewey and C. S. Peirce, but La Monte had accurately described that 
tradition's meaning in socialist discourse: the increasingly conservative 
John Spargo also came to see Marx not only as a social evolutionist but as a 
"pragmatist ." Walling ignored or finessed these questions. Did a "prag-
matic" revolutionist cooperate with progressive reformers or support the 
I.W.W.? Walling claimed to believe in revolutionary unionism and in 
socialist political organizing, and also in supporting progressive "meas-
ures" but not progressive " m e n . " But if one voted the socialist ticket, how 
did one "suppor t" progressive measures, which Walling expected would 
be enacted with or without socialist cooperation? Not surprisingly, he failed 
to make sense of this position when Lippmann, in a sharp exchange of 
letters, accused him of utter political naivete.43 
Walling's blend of pragmatism and revolutionary socialism remained a 
provocative but confused solution to the problems posed by the socialist 
evolutionary synthesis. His critique of the evolutionary tradition in 
socialist thought went to the heart of the Second International's compla-
cent scientism, deflating biologically based arguments for the gradual 
evolution of the state into a socialist organism. Its activist implications 
reflected his support for the I.W.W. But Walling's individualism was 
grounded in the liberal tradition, and he never fully reconciled its atomistic 
thrust with the collective demands of a socialist polity. He also never fully 
stepped outside of socialist scientism and evolutionary thinking, suggesting 
only that science had passed socialism by. Pragmatism, a philosophy 
grounded in the idea of evolutionary flux and change, ultimately carried 
him far from Marxism, which appeared only archaic and lawbound against 
the infinite possibilities of an open universe. The logical outcome of the 
pragmatic impatience with "content" and fixed principles was prag-
matism's emergence as the primary philosophy of liberal reform. The 
outcome for Walling, when he faced the crisis of world war and widespread 
socialist capitulation, was what Randolph Bourne called "radiant coopera-
tion with reality": estrangement from socialism and support for Woodrow 
Wilson's crusade. In the 1920s, Walling's once-radical critique of evolu-
tionary social theory dissipated, and he became what he had once despised: 
a mildly "fabian" collectivist, and a publicist for the American Federation 
of Labor.44 
87 
iii 
A 1914 Masses cover showed two apes sharing a newspaper emblazoned 
with the headline " W A R " ; said one ape to the other, "Mother, never let 
me hear you tell the children that these humans are descendants of 
ours ." 4 5 World War I destroyed both the Second International and the 
left's optimistic myth of evolution, including its pragmatic variants. Since 
the days of Engels, socialists had waged a counter-hegemonic struggle to 
appropriate modern scientific thought. Darwin's and Spencer's ideas had 
played a genuinely liberating role in the radicalization of many self-
educated workers and intellectuals. But evolutionism itself was partly 
formed in the context of bourgeois political thought, and when absorbed 
into socialist theory it allowed socialist intellectuals to reproduce the 
hierarchical organicism and inevitabilism that also came to characterize 
progressive corporate ideologies. When the war prompted them to leave 
the party, old socialists A. M. Simons and John Spargo redeployed their 
evolutionary arguments to support the corporate state. Others who 
remained radical, including Dell, Eastman and Fraina, had never been 
orthodox socialist evolutionists, and gravitated toward the nascent commu-
nist movement.46 
The war marked the deradicalization of the most prominent American 
socialist evolutionists. When La Monte forsook the party for the Connecti-
cut Home Guard, he sharply denounced the socialist faith in evolution as 
little more than disguised Calvinist predestination. Other radical intellec-
tuals, their allegiances stretched taut between socialist commitment and 
nationalism, found the passage less abrupt. Many who retained their belief 
in evolution and who continued temporarily to hope for some form of 
social democracy managed to interpret surface changes in American 
capitalism as milestones in the evolution toward socialism. To some 
wavering socialists schooled in the evolutionary method of thinking, an 
international war in a world evolving toward a higher state of integration 
could even appear as a positive evolutionary event in the long view. The 
war forced a convergence of new and old socialist opinions: Walling and 
Lippmann, along with Untermann, Simons and Spargo, allowed them-
selves to believe for a time that the war's massive organizational impetus 
might force union recognition and collectivism on the economy, break 
down national barriers, overthrow old-world autocracies and eventuate in 
a kind of international socialism—but their chastened vision resembled a 
Deweyite managerial state socialism more nearly than the democratic 
culture Walling had so hopefully projected. It was not long before they fully 
realigned themselves with a ruling class whose corporate ideal might 
optimistically be mistaken for incipient fabianism. A recalcitrant Ran-
dolph Bourne railed against the ex-radicals' "blaze of patriotism" in his 
1917 essay "Twilight of Idols": it was the erstwhile socialist evolutionists 
who were now "all living out that popular American 'instrumental' 
philosophy which Professor Dewey has formulated in such convincing and 
fascinating terms. ' ' 4 7 
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A useful work thus remained undone. What appear today as these New 
Intellectuals' characteristic concerns—Lippmann's dialectic of drift and 
mastery, Lowie's cultural relativism and empiricism, Waiting's pragmatic 
socialism—grew largely from their dissatisfactions with the evolutionary 
organicism and determinism that underlay socialist theory. All three 
emphasized the human capacity to create culture over subservience to 
biological imperatives. All had begun to think beyond the confines of the 
received capitalist technological order, with its oppressive division of labor 
and ideology of progress, to develop a genuinely democratic radical vision. 
They had tried to lay the basis for an activist scientific socialism enriched 
by the resources of modern culture. They had represented the best hope for 
a renewed American socialist theory, freed from the grip of Victorian 
evolutionism. But their pursuit of a new scientific vision, which opened 
socialist thought to fresh influences just as the crisis of international war 
confronted them, also eased their passages out of the socialist movement. 
With their defections, any hope that the Socialist Party would bequeath a 
useful intellectual legacy to the postwar left evaporated. After the war, their 
efforts were largely forgotten, expunged from the socialist record, along 
with the rest of the prewar intellectual tradition, by their successors in a 
shrunken party with little reason for evolutionary optimism.48 In the press 
of events, scientific socialism and the intellectuals had failed one another. 
For ex-socialists—the jaundiced Lippmann, or the bemused Lowie—as for 
the America of the 1920s, it was the bright promise of science that endured. 
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